St. John's Law Review
Volume 2
Number 2 Volume 2, May 1928, Number 2

Article 18

Negligence--Master and Servant--Ships and Shipping--Assumption
of Risk (Yaconi v. Brady & Gioe, Inc., 246 N.Y. 300 (1927))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
negligence may be considered in arriving at a verdict. 10 It appears,
therefore, that the plaintiff's contributory negligence would be a bar to
recovery if the jury found that such negligence existed.',
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AssumPTI1oN oF Risx.-Plaintiff, a stevedore, sued his employer in a
State court to recover for personal injuries. Defendant's liability was
claimed to have its basis in general maritime law unaffected by statute.
Plaintiff, with other men, was sent down into the hold of a vessel lying
in Nexi York harbor. He found some spots of grease or oil scattered
over the floor for a space of about a yard square. He called to the
gangwayman to notify the "boss" and have the condition remedied. He
had previously been advised to send word in this way whenever- necessary. The gangwayman told him to go ahead and that he would notify
the "boss." The condition was not remedied. Tile plaintiff slipped
upon the grease, fell and broke his leg. The jury's finding for the
plaintiff was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. On
appeal the defendant urged that if there was any negligence, it was that
of a fellow servant concerning a detail of the work and that plaintiff
assumed, as a matter of law, the risks incident to his employment. Held,
judgment reversed and complaint dismissed. The correction of the
danger was not merely a detail of the work. The master owed the duty
to the servant to use reasonable care in supplying a safe place to work.1
However, the plaintiff assumed the risk. The danger was obvious. Not
only obvious but the plaintiff marked and understood it. He knew that
there was no pathway to his work except across the path of danger. In
going on with the work he made the risk his own.
Yaconi v. Brady &
Gioe, Inc., 246 N. Y. 300 (1927).
The Court of Appeals distinguishes the principal case from an
epochal decision of the United States Supreme Court, 2 bringing steve10 In the principal case at page 349, Chief Judge Cardozo said: "Behavior
so reckless as to indicate indifference to peril on the part of a person of normal understanding may turn out in a given instance to be only contributory
negligence, as where a drunken man, unable to measure the risk, drives madly
through a crowded street. We have never yet held that fault so extreme can
co-exist with a right of action for damages, however absolute the nuisance.
(Cf. Chisholm v. State, 141 N. Y. 246 (1894); Morrell v. Peck, 88 N. Y. 398
(1882); Minick v. City of Troy, 83 N. Y. 514 (1881); cases of unguarded
openings in streets and bridges.")
11 The. distinction here made is important in the application of the Statute
of Limitations, actions to recover for nuisance being maintainable within six
years, while negligence actions must be commenced within three years. N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 46, 49.
2 Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52 (1914).
2 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50 (1926).
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dores within the protection of the Jones Act,3 by pointing out that even
if the Act were applicable it would have no bearing on its decision. The
Jones Act makes the employer liable for the negligence of a fellow
servant, and contributory negligence can be urged only in mitigaThe Haverty Case gives, a stevedore coming
tion of damages.
within the scope of the Jones Act the benefit of the Employers Liability
Act.4 However, the latter does not change the law. of assumption of
risk except where the injury is the result of a failure to comply with a
specific statutory duty.z The remedy afforded by the Jones Act to
seamen does not abrogate the right to maintain an action in admiralty."
By the general maritime law,. the defense of assumption of risk is
fmavailable when a seaman subject to the authority and discipline of the
master is injured aboard ship.7 On thi other hand there
8 is a volume of
authority that it is a good defense against a stevedore.
The authorities seem to agree that the use of defective ways or
works with notice thereof and appreciation of the hazard is assumption
is in
of risk and not coritributory negligence." The principal 1decision
harmony with the cases dealing with assumption o.frisk. 0
The language of the Court of Appeals 11 indicates its disapproval

3 Merchant

Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 41 -Stat 988, 1007.

4 Employer's Liability Act of Congress, 35 Stat. 65; Second Employer's

Liability Cases, 223 U. §. 1, 49 (1911).
•Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton. 233 U. S. 492, 503 (1914); Z39 U. S.
595, 600 (1916); Jacobs v. Southern Ry. Co., 241 U. S. 229 (1916).
6 Western Front, 1927 A. M. C. 1627 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1927); Osceola, 189
U. S. 158 (1903); Allianca, 264 U. S. 375 (1924); Engel v. Davenport. 271
U. S. 33 (1926).
7 Lynott v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 202 App. Div. 613. (zffd., 234 N. Y.
626 (1922); Crickett S.S. Co. v. Parry, 263 Fed. 523 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1920) ; cf.
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.. 247 U. S. 372 (1918).
8 Cu'nard S.S. Co. v. Smith, 255 Fed. 846 (1918); D. L. & W. R. R. Co.
v. Tomasco, 256 Fed. 14 (1919); cf. Maleeny v. Standard S. Corp., 237 N. Y.
250, 255 (1923) ; Holmes, J., in,Knickerbocker Ice Co. sr. Stewart, 253 U. S.
149, 167 (1920).
0 Maloney v. Cunard S.S. Co., 217 N. Y. 278, 282 (1916); Thomas v.
Quartermaine L. R. [18 Q. B. D.] 685, 698 (1887); Narramore v. Cleveland
C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 Fed. 298,'301, Taft, J., (1899); Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburg Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 590 (1911) ; O'Maley v.
Southern Boston Gas Light Co., 158 Mass. 135. 136 (1893); Dowd v. N. Y.
0. & W. Ry. Co., 170 N. Y. 459, 469 (1902); Beven on Negligence [3d ed.].
633; cf. Seaboard Air Line.Ry. v. Horton, supra, note 5.
10 Jacobs v. Southern Ry.Co., supra, note 5; Crown v. Orr, 140 N. Y. 450
(1893); Colleli v. Turner, 215 N. Y. 675 (1915); Larson v. Nassau Electric
R.R. Co., 223 N. Y. 14, 20 (1918); Butler v. Frazee, 211 U. S. 459 (1908).
11 Yaconi v. Brady & Gioe, Inc., supra, 305, 307. "The question has -been
argued whether it might properly have been tried under the * * * Jones
Act * * *. The Supreme Court has held that the act puts a stevedore within
the zone of itsprotection 'itis true that.for most purposes, as the word is
commonly used, stevedores are not seamen, but words are flexible.' * * * The
stevedore, however styled under the Jones Act, is not a seaman under the rule
of the general maritime law with itsspecial exemptions to those subject to
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of the Haverty decision. The principal case is judically and logically
sound, the Haverty Case is not., '
Under recent Congressional legislation, which has yet to meet the
test of constitutionality, a system of compensation is substituted for the
pre-existing rules and counter-rules. 14

WILLS - CONSTRUCTION - TRUSTS - PERPETUITIES. -Testator
died
leaving an estate of $150,000 to $200,000, and survived by his wife, a son
and a foster-daughter (who had never been adopted). By his will, he
gave the entire estate to a trustee in trust "from the income thereof to
pay monthly to our foster-daughter, Mabel Crans, so long as she may
live, the sum of fifty dollars ($50) per month for her personal use. The
balance of the income of my estate is to be paid to my wife, Ida L. Gallien, as she may desire it. Tf my said wife should be survived by our
son, Brace Goodwin Gallien, then the said balance of income or so much
thereof as may be necessary is to be expended for his proper support and
maintenance. * * * When the above payments shall cease by reason of
the deaths of the beneficiaries mentioned, I direct my said trustee to
pay the following bequests. * * * " The foster-daughter survived the
testator but four days. The Surrogate and the Appellate Division (by
a divided court) held the entire will void, the trust for the wife, son and
foster-daughter being deemed violative of statutory prohibitions against
the suspension of the power of alienation 1 and absolute ownership 2 for
more than two lives in being at the time of testator's death. Upon further appeal it was held: that under familiar canons of construction.:,

the power of the master * * *. One might as well bring within that class a

laborer employed by a contractor to repair a vessel in a drydock * * *. Such
a laborer is subject to the general maritime law. but not to the distinctive
features of that law which apply to seamen and no others. No one would
think of saying that his damages would be measured by maintenance, cure
and wages * * *. 'Words,' as we are told, 'are flexible.'"
12 See 1 St. John's L Rev. 76. "It is manifestly unsound to construe the
'Jones Act' as applying to stevedores and longshoremen. The whole tenor of
the act is for the protection of seamen and has no reference in any of its
provisions to other maritime employments. It is submitted that if Congress
intended to include other employments, it would not have restricted its language to 'seamen'."
13

Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of Congress.

March 4, 1927. 1927 A. M. C. 525. 556.
1 N.

Y. Real Prop. L. § 42:

" * * * Every future estate shall be void in

its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of alienation, by any
limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continu-

ance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate.* * *"
2 N. Y. Pers. Prop. L. § 11 : "The absolute ownership of personal property
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition, for a longer period than
during the continuance and until the termination of not more than two lives

in being. * * *"
3 Phillips v. Davies, 92 N. Y. 199 (1883) ; Roe z. Vingut, 117 N. Y. 204.

22 N. E. 933 (1889); Greene v.Greene, 125 N. Y. 506, 26 N. E. 739 '(1891).

